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Abstract
It has been argued that in the absence of altruism,
intergenerational transfers can survive only if the old are net
recipients. I prove that this need not hold in an over-lapping
generations model with a fixed factor. For example, the middle-
aged owning land may gain by providing public education even
when they cannot tax the young. This requires that labor is not
mobile. Furthermore, establishing public education may benefit
only the generation which pays for education twice, first for itself
and then for the next generation.
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Conventional wisdom argues that in the absence of altruism, an older generation may
pay for the education of the following generation only if it can reap gains through social
security bene¯ts or other forms of public expenditure. Konrad (1995) formalizes this ar-
gument by showing that even a gerontocracy controlled by the old may ¯nd it optimal to
¯nance education for the young in order to boost social security tax revenue. Rangel (2000)
developed a theory of intergenerational exchange for sel¯sh generations. He distinguished
between intergenerational goods which are provided by the middle-aged to the young and
those which are provided by the middle-aged to the old. He shows that a pay-as-you-go
system may be self-sustainable if it generates a positive surplus for each participating gen-
eration. However, providing education for the younger generation is not sustainable without
linking it into su±ciently big transfers to the old. If the surplus generated by the pay-as-
you-go system and other goods provided by the middle-aged to the old does not exceed the
costs of providing the education and other intergenerational goods that bene¯t the young,
then the middle-aged would prefer to repudiate such an intergenerational contract.
If pay-as-you-go social security system were the only mechanism allowing public provi-
sion of education to survive, then privatizing social security would eliminate public provision
of education. In a world of credit constraints or non-insurable risks, this could have dire
consequences for future growth and welfare. In a world with full certainty and no credit
market constraints, we would expect an e±cient level of private investment in human capi-
2tal. However, there are market mechanisms which may encourage the middle-aged to ¯nance
education for the young even in the absence of social security taxes or any other public ex-
penditures bene¯ting the old. If the middle-aged have a stake in the future and the value
of that stake depends on future human capital, the middle-aged may voluntarily invest in
the younger generation. Boldrin (1994) presented a closed economy model in which the
working generation accumulates physical capital, physical capital and human capital being
technologically complementary. When the young would otherwise make an ine±ciently low
educational investment, the middle-aged may collectively ¯nd it rational to invest in the hu-
man capital of the following generation in order to increase the value of their physical capital.
Education provided for the young is essentially a public good bene¯ting all the middle-aged.
Public provision of education is used to avoid free riding. Boldrin and Montes (2000) general-
ize this insight by arguing that pay-as-you-go social security system may encourage e±cient
human capital investment by increasing the stake that the current middle-aged generation
has in future production.
My paper argues that there exists a market mechanism which may render investment in
human capital of the following generation pro¯table even without any market failure, and
with internationally mobile ¯nancial capital. This mechanism consists of market transactions
of land.1 Here land should be interpreted generally to incorporate all ¯xed factors used in
production. The middle-aged may want to invest in the young in order to receive a better
price for land when they sell it to the following generation. While Konrad (1995) recognizes
1Homburg (1991) demonstrates the importance of including land in the production function in a growth
model. Intergenerational trade in land rules out dynamic ine±ciency as well as Golden Rule growth.
3this mechanism in the discussion, it is not included in his model. Furthermore, in Konrad's
model, public provision of social capital is ¯nanced with taxes collected from the young
later in the same period. In contrast, in this paper the middle-aged generation deciding on
publicly provided education also ¯nances it.
The introduction of land into an OLG framework generates the following new and sur-
prising results. First of all, the middle-aged may want to provide public education even if the
young would not face any credit market constraints, and could ¯nance their education them-
selves. The old may voluntarily overinvest in the young even when they cannot tax any of the
productivity increase. Secondly, it is possible that all welfare gains from establishing public
education accrue to the generation which pays for education twice, once for itself and then
for the subsequent generation. Numerical analysis suggest that all the following generations
lose. This result is in marked contrast with the intuitive expectation that the generation
establishing public education without being able to tax any of the bene¯ts through a social
security system would be made worse o®. Thirdly, an intergenerational contract relying on
a voluntary provision of a good for the next generation may under certain conditions be a
bad equilibrium for the steady state generations.
Rangel's (2000) results suggest that voluntary intergenerational transfers may survive
only if they produce a surplus for all participating generations. He also argues that the
middle-aged would always repudiate even an e±cient social contract under which they invest
in the following generation without receiving any transfers back. According to Konrad
(1995), there may be an overinvestment in social capital by the older generation. The older
4generation chooses social capital investment to maximize tax revenue from the young net
of investment costs. Cooley and Soares (1999) construct a model in which a pay-as-you-go
system can be adopted as a voting equilibrium among generations in a closed economy. The
middle-aged and old generations consider the contributions they have made as sunk costs.
My paper di®ers from these earlier contributions in that resources are voluntarily transferred
from an older to a younger generation without any transfers back from the younger to the
older generations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the laissez-faire solution. There
are no e±ciency or welfare motivations for public investment, implying that the laissez-faire
outcome is Pareto e±cient. Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which the middle-
aged prefer to ¯nance education publicly. Game theoretically, the economy is depicted as
a repeated game with overlapping generations of players in the spirit of Kandori (1991),
Salant (1992), Smith (1992), Boldrin and Montes (2000) and Rangel (2000). As in Rangel
(2000), the provision of education is assumed to rely on a trigger strategy. Each middle-aged
generation assumes that if it would repudiate from providing public education, then all the
following middle-aged generations would also repudiate, and the economy would end up in a




5There are three generations: the young, the middle-aged and the old. The young invest
in education, the middle-aged work, and the old derive income from land ownership. There
is perfect certainty and all individuals of each generation are identical. All individuals
make their decisions in a decentralized manner. The mass of each generation (cohort) is
normalized at unity and consists of a continuum of individuals, so that each individual
behaves atomistically.
Production combines land and human capital supplied by the middle-aged. All individu-
als can borrow and lend internationally at a constant world interest rate. The time structure
inside a period is as follows:
1. Production takes place. The middle-aged supply their labor inelastically.
2. The middle-aged receive their marginal product as their wage income, and the old
receive the income accruing to land. The middle-aged pay back the loan that they have
taken as young. The young take a loan.
3. The old sell land to the middle-aged. They pay back the loan taken (receive back the
savings made) when they were the middle-aged. The middle-aged decide on their net saving
for the old age.
4. The young complete their education and pay for it using the loan they have taken.
It is not essential to de¯ne at which point the young start investment in education.
Furthermore, production may also continue during latter parts of the period. The results
are also insensitive to a change in which the old would sell land to the middle-aged before
6land receives its factor income. The timing of individual actions, except for consumption
and saving decisions, is depicted in Figure 1. The timeline is divided into three periods
corresponding to youth, middle age, and old age.
Figure 1
Production in period t, Yt, is determined by a Cobb-Douglas function combining human
capital in the economy in the respective period, Ht, and land. The amount of land is




in which ®;0 < ® < 1; is the elasticity of production with respect to human capital, and
also the share of production accruing to human capital.
Human capital of a representative individual, ht, is equal to Ht as cohort size is normalized
at unity. Human capital of an individual in period t depends on that individual's educational
investment in period t ¡ 1. Educational investment e consists of inputs whose price is





in which 0 < ¯ < 1 captures the assumption that the marginal productivity of educational
inputs is diminishing.
7The middle-aged have to wait for one period before they receive income from the own-
ership of land and the income from selling it to the following generation. The arbitrage
requires that the return on the ownership of land equals the world interest rate, denoted by
r. Therefore, the land value in period t, Vt, is determined by:
(1 + r)Vt = (1 ¡ ®)H
®
t+1 + Vt+1: (1)
2.2. Equilibrium under laissez-faire
Time indices are dropped, as in the steady-state equilibrium et = et+1 = e and therefore
Ht = Ht+1 = H and Vt = Vt+1 = V . The young individually choose their own educational
investment. Each young individual takes the expected net return on human capital, denoted













The left-hand side tells the net present value of return on marginal educational invest-
ment, whereas the right-hand side is the marginal cost. As there are no borrowing con-
8straints, investment is made in order to maximize net present value of wage income net of













Note that the ownership of land has no e®ect on educational choices. The reason for this
is that for each individual, perfect international capital market allows to separate decisions
of investment in education from the intertemporal allocation of consumption. In the steady-
state equilibrium, the price of land is
V (b e) =
(1 ¡ ®)b e®¯
r
: (4)
3. Public provision of education
3.1 The setting of intergenerational game
Under public provision of education, steps 1, 2 and 3 inside a period are the same as in
9the laissez-faire solution. The fourth step, however, reads now as:
4' The middle-aged vote on a lump-sum tax collected from themselves to purchase edu-
cation for the young. The young voluntarily receive the education.
As all the middle-aged are identical, they agree on the lump-sum tax. The time structure
is such that the middle-aged cannot commit to a given provision of human capital for the
next generation before they purchase land from the old.2 Other parts of the time structure
could be changed without a®ecting the results as described in subsection 2.1. The timing of
individual actions except for saving and consumption is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Denote the ¯rst period in which publicly provided education can take place by 0, and
the lump-sum tax collected in period t by ¿t.3 Lump-sum tax ¿t is equal to educational
investment as there is no population growth. It is assumed that if public provision of
education can be sustained in equilibrium, then there is an equilibrium tax rate b ¿.4 Starting
from period t = 0, each middle-aged generation either deviates or adopts the following trigger
strategy:
2It is enough to assume that the middle-aged cannot commit to not purchasing more education for the
young than they have declared beforehand. As the price that the middle-aged pay for the land turns out
to be increasing in expected future human capital, it would be never in the interest of the middle-aged to
claim before buying the land that they would invest more in human capital than they would actually do.
3I have assumed that the possibility of publicly provided education becomes known only in the ¯rst period
when it can be established after the middle-aged have bought the land. In that sense, the introduction of
taxation technology is an unpredicted shock to the model.
4As there is no population growth or technological change, there is no reason to expect that the tax rate
would change over time. In a growing economy, we would analyze an equilibrium path of tax rates over time.
While this would make the analysis more cumbersome, it would not provide any additional insight.
10¿t =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
b ¿ if t = 0
b ¿ if ¿0 = ¿1 = ::: = ¿t¡1 = b ¿ and t ¸ 1
0 otherwise
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
: (5)
If ¿t 6= b ¿ and ¿t > 0, then the economy reverts in the following period to the laissez-
faire equilibrium in which each generation purchases its own education in a non-coordinated
manner. Lump-sum tax is restricted to be non-negative. If the middle-aged choose ¿t = 0,
then the economy immediately reverts to private educational investments by the young.
3.2. Equilibrium with public education
Let us ¯rst assume that there exists a steady state equilibrium with publicly provided
education. As cohort size is normalized at unity, human capital in the steady-state equilib-
rium with lump-sum tax b ¿ is given by b ¿
¯. This allows to solve as the steady-state market
price of land
V (b ¿) =




When the initial generation decides on whether to switch to public education, it has
already purchased land. Therefore, the price that it has paid for land is irrelevant for
11the choice of educational policy. Public investment in education is chosen to maximize the
discounted sum of rental income and sale revenue of land in the next period, net of investment
cost. As b ¿ can be sustained in equilibrium, the middle-aged generation of period 0 knows
that future generations will choose the same level of taxation as they choose. Rental income

















The middle-aged of period 0 want to establish public provision of education instead of
laissez-faire solution only if this increases their lifetime net income. A su±cient and necessary
condition for this is derived in Appendix A. Appendix A proves also that this is a su±cient
and necessary condition for the public provision to be sustainable in equilibrium. The results
can be summarized as
Proposition 1. The presence of land may alone motivate public provision of education, even
when private investments would be e±cient and there is no altruism. Education is provided








Proof. See Appendix A.
12It also holds that
Proposition 2. Public provision of education leads to a bigger investment in education than
in a decentralized solution.
Proof. The land value is increasing in human capital. As the laissez-faire solution is always
available, a necessary condition for the middle-aged to provide education publicly is that it
increases human capital su±ciently to increase the present value of lifetime income of the
middle-aged net of taxes. ¤
The land value plays a role equivalent to the trigger strategy's role in Rangel (2000).
In Rangel's model, the trigger strategy relies on transfers from the younger to the older
generations. In my model, there is no need for transfers from the young to the old. Instead,
the trigger strategy relies on decentralized and voluntary market transactions. If a middle-
aged generation deviates from the public provision of education to the following generation,
then it would su®er a capital loss in the land value.
Numerical examples suggest that the internationally determined interest rate has to be
very low to justify public provision of education.5 This is not surprising as my results are
derived using the extreme assumption that public provision does not o®er any e±ciency gains,
5For example, for ® = ¯ = 1
2 the condition is r < 27
101. If this would be accrued over 20 years, yearly
interest rate should be less than 1:2 per cent. With only a 10 year delay between investment cost and trade
in land, a yearly interest rate would still have to be less than 2:4 per cent.
13and that the middle-aged generation ¯nances education entirely without being able to tax
any of its bene¯ts. Furthermore, assuming the Cobb-Douglas production function excluded
the possibility that the share of production going to the land owners could be increased by
increasing the stock of human capital, and there was no growth. Including a social security
tax would increase the range of interest rates in which the middle-aged generation would
¯nd it optimal to ¯nance education. Furthermore even without social security taxes, the
middle-aged generation may resort to the less expensive strategy of subsidizing educational
investment only partially. However, these modi¯cations are not needed to prove that it may
be in the interest of the older generations to engage in unilateral transfers to the younger
generations.
The welfare e®ects of providing public education on future generations are not clear ex
ante. On one hand, future generations are able to postpone the ¯nancing of education from
youth to middle-age, thereby saving the interest payment on investment. On the other hand,
the resulting level of educational investments is not e±cient. Numerical analysis suggests
that the establishment of public education lowers the utility of the current young and all
future generations.6 Therefore, there is no potential of intergenerational Pareto improvement
through the establishment of public education. What is remarkable is that none of the steady
6Numerical analysis was carried out for all values of ® 2 [0:1;0:9];¯ 2 [0:1;0:9];r ¸ 0:05 at the interval
of 0:01. I ¯rst calculated the parameter combinations with which the middle-aged of period 0 would prefer
to establish public provision of education. Then I compared the net present value of lifetime income for a
steady state generation under the laissez-faire solution and under the public provision of education. Under
very low interest rates, lump-sum taxes may exceed wages for the steady state generations. Even though it
were interpreted that the model is not applicable with those values, there is still a range of interest rates in
which it is pro¯table for the middle-aged to provide education for the young even though they cannot tax
the young, and the steady state generations have a lower positive net lifetime income under public provision
of education than under a laissez-faire equilibrium.
14state generations has an incentive to abolish the system of public education once established
as proved in Appendix A.
4. Equilibrium with mobile labor
In this section, I analyze the implications of labor mobility on education policy. While
lump-sum taxes, proportional taxes and public resources per student were equivalent policy
variables with a constant population, this equivalence no longer holds with migration. For
example, constant educational resources per young person over time imply changes in tax
burden of the middle-aged workers when there is migration. Lump-sum taxes would imply
that the percentage of wage income paid in taxes would be di®erent across native citizens
and immigrants, if they have di®erent endowment of human capital. Therefore, lump-sum
taxation is no longer just a simplifying technical assumption that it was in the previous
section. To capture the fact that taxes are typically levied on income, I therefore de¯ne
public policy in this section as a choice of wage-tax rate ¿w.7 In a steady state with a
constant population over time, this would also imply constant educational resources per
young person over time.
I have assumed that there are no migration costs, and that domestic and foreign human
capital are perfect substitutes in production everywhere. Migration decisions take place
at the beginning of the middle-age after education is completed. Migration decisions are
7Time index is dropped for simplicity.
15made under perfect foresight, so that individuals correctly anticipate post-migration human
capital in di®erent regions and decisions that will be made concerning whether to provide
education publicly. Migration decisions are made in order to maximize wage income net of
taxes. Public policy a®ects migration decisions only through its e®ects on after-tax wage
income. Arbitrage conditions imply that return on land ownership is the same everywhere,
so that it does not play any role in migration decisions. The region analyzed is small in
relation to the whole world and takes the after-tax return on human capital, e ½, as given.
The timing of individual actions except for saving and consumption in a laissez-faire region
with private educational decisions is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3
With labor mobility, return on human capital in a laissez-faire economy is determined by
e ½ = ®H
®¡1;








With publicly provided education, the timing of individual actions except for saving and
consumption is depicted in Figure 4.
16Figure 4
With tax rate ¿w, after-tax return on human capital is determined by
e ½ = (1 ¡ ¿w)®H
®¡1;








Note that post-migration human capital is independent of human capital produced in
the economy, regardless of whether such investments are chosen by individuals or through
publicly provided education. This implies
Proposition 3. With labor mobility, the middle-aged never provide public education with
decentralized taxation.
Proof. The land value depends on post-migration human capital. In the steady state it
is given by V (¿w) = [(1 ¡ ®)H(¿w)®]=r. (8) reveals that
@H(¿w)
@¿w < 0, implying that post-
migration human capital is the smaller the higher the tax rate to ¯nance public education.
This implies that establishing publicly provided education would lead both to a capital loss
17in land value and also to a decrease in income due to taxes. Therefore, it is pro¯table for
the middle-aged in each region to abolish publicly provided education. ¤
Proposition 3 does not require that all regions would be identical. A su±cient condition
is that all regions take net return on human capital as given, and human capital is perfectly
mobile. Regions may di®er in population size, the amount of land, and even in production
technologies. If regions are di®erent, then the middle-aged in those regions receiving mi-
gration may gain from allowing international migration, whereas the middle-aged in other
regions are likely to be hurt. In a world consisting of identical regions, a transition from
no-migration equilibrium to free labor mobility has the following e®ects:
Proposition 4. Allowing free mobility between identical regions which initially provide ed-
ucation publicly results in the abolishment of public education. The land owners at the time
of liberalization lose as land values drop to a laissez-faire level. Steady-state production is
decreased.
Proof. By proposition 2, public education implies increased human capital investment. As
liberalization eliminates public education, it lowers both steady-state production and land
value. If the old have not yet sold land to the middle-aged when the liberalization takes
place, they bear the full loss. If liberalization takes place after land has been sold, then the
middle-aged bear the loss. The middle-aged lose even when liberalization takes place before
they have provided education publicly, and can therefore save the taxes by abolishing public
18education immediately. The reason for this is that if the net present value of the di®erence
in land value would not exceed the cost of public education, then public provision would not
be equilibrium, even without migration in the ¯rst place. ¤
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I demonstrated that the intergenerational trade in land may have many
e®ects on the provision of intergenerational goods. In a model without land, Rangel (2000)
proved that voluntary intergenerational transfers can survive only if they generate a positive
surplus for the old. I show that if there is intergenerational trade in land, the middle-aged
may voluntarily provide education for the young even when they do not receive any transfers.
The provision of public education may be established solely in order to increase market value
of land. Furthermore, the provision of public education may lead to excessive investment in
human capital even when it does not change the actual share of production going to human
capital.
Globalization may undermine public support for education in two di®erent ways. First
of all, labor mobility restricts redistribution between di®erent groups, as demonstrated by
Wildasin (1991) and many other authors. This paper shows that labor mobility eliminates
the incentives for a middle-aged generation to provide education in order to increase the
land value, as an increase in human capital would be diluted internationally. Secondly, this
paper also suggests that international dispersion of the land ownership decreases national
19incentives to provide education for the following generation even when labor is immobile.
The smaller the share of land owned domestically, the less the middle-aged are prepared to
pay in taxes in order to increase its market value.
While public provision of education turned out to be excessive in my simple model, it
may play a bene¯cial role for younger generations in a more complex model. If there are
externalities associated with education or if there are imperfect credit markets for the young
or missing insurance markets for income risks associated with education, then public inter-
vention may provide a Pareto improvement. Under those circumstances, the deterioration
of public education may counterweight potential bene¯ts of globalized labor markets. Fur-
thermore, my model suggests that the ownership of land may play an important role in the
political decision-making on intergenerational goods even when land is untaxed. The more
widely the land ownership is distributed inside an economy, the wider the support for invest-
ment in the following generation. In a globalized economy, investing social security wealth
in domestic market may be justi¯ed in order to provide incentives for the older generation
to invest in the younger generation. Therefore, even a funded social security system might
be able to provide incentives to public investment in the human capital of the following
generation, provided that such social security funds are invested in domestic market, and
labor mobility is su±ciently low.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
I calculate ¯rst the payo® for a middle-aged generation from playing the equilibrium
strategy. Then I calculate the payo® from deviation and show the condition under which no
deviation from the equilibrium strategy is pro¯table.
The payo® from the assumed equilibrium strategy de¯ned by (5) and (7) for the middle-
aged generation is the same for all middle-aged generations as long as there has been no
deviation, including the ¯rst generation which may provide education publicly.8 Substituting





1¡®¯ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
r
: (A.1)
8While the ¯rst generation turns out to be better o® when public education is adopted, this di®erence
follows from it having paid a lower price for land when publicly provided education was not yet available. All
the following generations have to pay a higher land price if public education is established and maintained.
As these trades take place in each period before the decision of lump-sum taxes is made, they do not enter
the decision on taxes. Therefore, the ¯rst generation and all the following generations play the equilibrium
strategy under the same conditions.
21I analyze ¯rst a deviation to ¿ = 0. This leads into the laissez-faire equilibrium. In the
laissez-faire equilibrium, the middle-aged receive by (3) and (4)














Next I analyze a deviation to any positive lump-sum tax which di®ers from the equi-
librium strategy. Formally, I solve for an optimal ¿d when ¿d > 0;¿d 6= b ¿. By the trigger
strategy, a deviation would imply that from the following period onwards, the economy





















It is easy to show that substituting (A.4) into (A.3) leads into a smaller value than (A.2).
Therefore, the most pro¯table deviation is ¿ = 0, implying an immediate reversion to the
laissez-faire equilibrium. Thus, public provision is preferred if the net present value of income
given by (A.1) exceeds the laissez-faire outcome given by (A.2). This condition yields
r <
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)
1¡®¯
®¯




22Therefore, public education is established and sustained in equilibrium if and only if condition
(A.5) is met.
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